

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9659

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4906

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0281

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: U.S. POSITION ON EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL

REF: A) STATE 11498 (NOTAL); B) STATE 12465 (NOTAL)

1. THIS MESSAGE REPORDUCES THE TEXT OF THE PAPER ON THE U.S. POSITION REGARDING THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL WHICH TH MISSION DISTRIBUTED AT THE JANUARY 20 MEETING OF THE SENIOR POLADS COMMITTEE. THE PAPER IS DRAWN FROM TH SUBSTANCE OF REFTELS A AND B.

2. BEGIN TEXT

A. THE U.S. CONSIDERS THAT A FREEZE COMMITMENT WOULD GIVE THE EAST ONE OF THE MAIN THINGS IT WANTS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS-- LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF NATO FORCES WITH NO COMMENSURATE GAINS FOR THE WEST. IT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE EAST A PROPAGANDA VEHICLE FOR OBJECTING TO US AND NATO EFFORTS TO SUBSTITUTE COMBAT FOR SECRET

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SUPPORT FORCES AND COULD INTERFERE WITH U.S. EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS FORCE AT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH.

B. ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON A FORCE FREEZE IN 1975 WOULD MEET THE

EVIDENT DESIRE OF SOVIET NEGOTIATORS TO SHOW PROGRESS IN 1975, AT TIME-FRAME TO WHICH BREZHNEV IS PUBLICLY COMMITTED. IF THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO MEET THEIR OWN CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PROGRESS IN VIENNA IN 1975 THROUGH A FREEZE AGREEMENT WITH THE WEST, THEY WOULD NO LONGER BE UNDER PRESSURE TO REACH SPECIFIC REDUCTION RESULTS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE A TIME LIMITED FREEZE WOULD LIKELY BE EXTENDED SO LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE, THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED TIME TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS, WHILE THE WEST WILL BE SUBJECT TO INCREASING PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURES.

C. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW LEAKS, PRESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL HAS THUS FAR BEEN MINIMAL, AND THE ALLIES ARE UNDER NO PRESSURE TO AGREE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE POSITION DESCRIBED BELOW WOULD ENABLE ALLIED OFFICIALS TO TELL INTERESTED ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THEIR COUNTRIES THAT THE WEST DOES NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE A FREEZE IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDUCTIONS AND IN FACT HAS PROPOSED TO THE EAST A FREEZE ON ALL THEIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA TO COMPLEMENT PHASE I REDUCTIONS. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE VIENNA TALKS FOCUS ON THEIR REAL BUSINESS OF NEGOTIATING REDUCTIONS AND NOT GET SIDETRACKED ONTO OTHER QUESTIONS. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT, IF THIS APPROACH IS ADEQUATELY PRESENTED, IT SHOULD EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH SEGMENTS OF WESTERN POLITICAL OR PUBLIC OPINION WHICH MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A FREEZE.

D. THE MAIN CONCERN OF THE U.S. WITH THE IDEA OF A COUNTER-PROPOSAL TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL IS THAT THE ALLIES NOT COMMIT THEMSELVES IN PRINCIPLE TO A FREEZE SEPARATE FROM AND PRIOR TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS -- A POSITION WHICH, AS HAS BEEN SHOWN, ACHIEVES A MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVE WITH NO COMMENSURATE GAIN FOR THE WEST. ONCE HAVING MADE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL, THE WEST WOULD BE OBLIGED TO NEGOTIATE ON IT AND THE SOVIETS PROBABLY WOULD BE UNWILLING TO TURN TO A DISCUSSION OF REDUCTIONS UNTIL A FREEZE HAD BEEN AGREED ON.

E. EVEN IF AFTER EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIETS AGREED IN
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SOME FORM TO THE PRINCIPAL ALLIANCE POINTS --EXCHANGE OF DATA AND NO NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS -- IT WOULD NOT BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE

TO AGREE TO A FREEZE. OTHER PRECEDENTS ESTABLISHED THEREBY SUCH AS UNEQUAL MANPOWER CEILINGS AN INVOLVEMENT OF ALL ELEMENTS AND COUNTRIES, PLUS THE REDUCED PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS, WOULD MORE THAN OFFSET THESE GAINS.

F. MOREOVER, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALLIED EFFORTS TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO THE FREEZE PROPOSAL WOULD PROVE SUCCESSFUL.

THE SOVIETS COULD OFFER COMPROMISE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD BLUR OR UNDERMINE ALLIED ARGUMENTS FOR NOT ACCEPTING EASTERN CONDITIONS.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE EAST MIGHT ACCEPT A FREEZE AT THE LEVELS ESTABLISHED BY ALLIED DATA WHILE MAINTAINING ITS POSITION THAT THE DATA ARE NOT ACCURATE; OR CLAIM THAT DATA EXCHANGE WOULD BE TOO TIME-CONSUMING BEFORE A FREEZE, WHILE EXPRESSING WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN IT AFTER A FREEZE. THE EAST MIGHT ALSO ACCEPT OVERALL CEILINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A FREEZE ONLY, ACCOMPANIED BY DISCLAIMER OF PRECEDENT FOR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS. IN THESE WAYS, THE EAST COULD FORCE THE ALLIES TO ACCEPT A FREEZE WITHOUT SATISFYING ANY OF THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED.

G. FOR THESE REASONS, THE U.S. CONSIDERS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DEFINITELY REJECT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, AND PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE TO THE ADHOC GROUP:

"THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO TELL THE EAST THAT, AFTER MUCH STUDY, THE ALLIES HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THEY SHOULD STATE THAT THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE VIENNA TALKS IS TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES DO NOT OPPOSE A FREEZE AS SUCH, BUT BELIEVE THAT A FREEZE SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED A FREEZE IN CONNECTION WITH PHASE I REDUCTIONS, AND THEY CONSIDER THAT THIS COMBINATION OF FREEZE AND REDUCTIONS REPRESENTS A MORE PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN THE EASTERN APPROACH."

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 0281

H. THE U.S. ALSO PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING LINE OF ARGUMENT FOR USE BY WESTERN OFFICIALS WITH PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESS OPINION

IN CAPITALS, BRUSSELS, AND VIENNA, IN THE EVENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE FREEZE PROPOSAL:

"ALLIED OFFICIALS COULD, IF NECESSARY, DRAW ON THE POINTS BELOW IN DISCUSSING THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL WITH WESTERN PRESS OR PARLIAMENTS:

(1) THE EAST HAS MADE A PROPOSAL IN VIENNA TO FREEZE ALL AIR AND GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT PRESENT LEVELS.

(2) NATO, FOR ITS PART, HAS PROPOSED TO THE EAST IN CONNECTION WITH A FIRST TROOP REDUCTION AGREEMENT A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE AND THUS TO FREEZE GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

(3) THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS ARE:

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A. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FREEZING FORCE LEVELS AT THEIR PRESENT UNEQUAL LEVEL, CONTRACTUALIZING EASTERN GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY. THE WEST IS AIMING FOR PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS.

B. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS NOT CONNECTED WITH REDUCTIONS, WHICH ARE THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND SEEMS DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE EAST TO AGREE TO REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL IS A PACKAGE PROPOSAL ENVISAGING SIGNIFICANT SOVIET AND U.S. REDUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH A COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE REMAINING GROUND AND AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

C. THE EAST THUS FAR HAS REFUSED TO EXCHANGE FORCE STRENGTH DATA WITH THE WEST. THERE CANNOT BE A FORCE FREEZE UNLESS ONE KNOWS AT WHAT LEVELS FORCES ARE BEING FROZEN. THE ALLIED PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PRECISE DATA WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE OFFERED TO EXCHANGE WITH THE EAST WOULD BE AGREED.

D. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL SEEKS TO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS ON THE FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL

FORESEES A COLLECTIVE CEILING WHICH WOULD PERMIT CONTINUED INTRA-ALLIED COOPERATION AND SPECIALIZATION.

(4) AS REGARDS DISCUSSION ON THIS TOPIC, THE WEST IS STILL SEEKING TO GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO ITS PROPOSALS AS PART OF AN OVERALL REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT."

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